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Researchers often misinterpret and misrepresent statistical outputs. This abuse
has led to a large literature on modification or replacement of testing thresholds
and P-values with confidence intervals, Bayes factors, and other devices. Because
the core problems appear cognitive rather than statistical, we review some sim-
ple proposals to aid researchers in interpreting statistical outputs. These propos-
als emphasize logical and information concepts over probability, and thus may be
more robust to commonmisinterpretations than are traditional descriptions. The
latter treat statistics as referring to targetedhypotheses conditional onbackground
assumptions. In contrast, we advise reinterpretation of P-values and interval esti-
mates in unconditional terms, in which they describe compatibility of datawith the
entire set of analysis assumptions. We use the Shannon transform of the P-value
p, also known as the surprisal or S-value s = − log(p), to provide a measure of the
information supplied by the testing procedure against these assumptions, and to
help calibrate intuitions against simple physical experiments like coin tossing. We
also advise tabulating or graphing test statistics for alternative hypotheses, and
interval estimates for different percentile levels, to thwart fallacies arising from
arbitrary dichotomies. We believe these simple reforms are well worth the minor
effort they require.
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1 | BACKGROUND
Statistical science is fraught with psychological aswell as technical difficulties, yet far less attentionhas been given to cognitive problems than to tech-
nical minutiae and computational devices [1, 2]. If the is-
sues that plague science could be resolved bymechanical
algorithms, statisticians and computer scientists would
have disposed of them long ago. But the core problems
are of human psychology and social environment, one in
which researchers apply traditional frameworks based on
fallacious rationales and poor understanding [1, 3]. These
problems have nomathematical or philosophical solution,
and instead require attention to the unglamorous task of
developing tools, interpretations and terminology more
resistant tomisstatement and abuse thanwhat tradition
has handed down.
We believe that neglect of these problems is amajor
contributor to the current crisis of statistics in science [4–
9]. Several informal descriptions of statistical formulas
may be reasonable when strictly adhered to, but neverthe-
less lead to severe misinterpretations in practice. Users
tend to take extra leaps and shortcuts, hencewe need to
anticipate implications of terminology and interpretations
to improve practice. In doing so, we find it remarkable that
the P-value is once again at the center of the controversy,
despite the fact that some journals strongly discouraged
reporting P-values decades ago [10], and complaints about
misinterpretation of statistical significance date back over
a a century [11–13]. Equally remarkable is the diversity
of proposed solutions, ranging frommodifications of con-
ventional fixed-cutoff testing [14–17] to complete aban-
donment of traditional tests in favor of interval estimates
[18–20] or Bayesian tests [21, 22]; no consensus appears
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in sight.
While few doubt that some sort of reform is needed,
the following crucial points are often overlooked:
1. There is no universally valid way to analyze data and
thus no single solution to the problems at hand.
2. Careful integration of contextual information and
technical considerations will always be essential.
3. Most researchers are under pressure to produce
definitive conclusions, and sowill resort to familiar au-
tomated approaches and questionable defaults [23],
with orwithout P-values or “statistical significance.”
4. Most researchers lack the time or skills for re-
education, so we need methods that are simple to
acquire quickly based on what is commonly taught,
yet are also less vulnerable to commonmisinterpreta-
tion than are traditional approaches (or at least have
not yet become as widely misunderstood as those ap-
proaches).
Thus, rather than propose abandoning old methods in
favor of entirely new ones, we will review simple cognitive
devices, terminological reforms, and conceptual shifts that
encouragemore realistic, accurate interpretations of con-
ventional statistical summaries. Specifically, we will advise
that:
• We should replace decisive-sounding, overconfident
terms like “significance,” “nonsignificance” and “confi-
dence interval,” as well as proposed replacements like
“uncertainty interval,” withmoremodest descriptors
such as “low compatibility,” “high compatibility” and
“compatibility interval” [24–26].
• We should teach alternate ways to view P-values and
interval estimates via informationmeasures such as S-
values (surprisals), which are the negative logarithms
of the P-values; thesemeasures facilitate translation
of statistical test results into results from simple phys-
ical experiments [25].
• For quantities targeted for study, we should replace
single P-values, S-values, and interval estimates by ta-
bles or graphs of P-values or S-values showing results
for relevant alternative hypotheses as well as for null
hypotheses.
• Weshould from the start teach that the usual interpre-
tations of statistical outputs are oftenmisleading even
when they are technically accurate. This is because
they condition on background assumptions (i.e., they
treat them as given), and thus they ignore what may
be serious uncertainty about those assumptions. This
deficiency can be most directly and nontechnically
addressed by treating them unconditionally, shifting
their logical status from assumptions to components
of the tested framework.
We have found that the last recommendation (to de-
condition inferences [25]) is the most difficult for most
readers to comprehend, and is even resisted andmisrepre-
sented by some with extensive credentials in statistics.
Thus, to keep the present paper of manageable length
we have written a companion piece, Greenland & Chow,
2019 [25], which explains in depth the rationale for de-
emphasizing traditional conditional interpretations in fa-
vor of unconditional interpretations.
2 | AN EXAMPLE
Wewill display some of these problems and recommenda-
tions with published results from a record-based cohort
study of serotonergic antidepressant prescriptions dur-
ing pregnancy and subsequent autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) of the child (Brown et al. [27]). Out of 2,837 preg-
nancies that had filled prescriptions, approximately 2% of
the childrenwere diagnosedwith ASD. The paper first re-
ported an adjusted ratio of ASD rates (hazard ratio or HR)
of 1.59when comparingmotherswith andwithout the pre-
scriptions, and 95% confidence limits (CI) of 1.17 and 2.17.
This estimate was derived from a proportional-hazards
model which includedmaternal age, parity, calendar year
of delivery, neighborhood income quintile, resource use,
psychotic disorder, mood disorder, anxiety disorder, alco-
hol or substance use disorder, use of other serotonergic
medications, psychiatric hospitalization during pregnancy,
and psychiatric emergency department visit during preg-
nancy.
The paper then presented an analysiswith adjustment
based on a high-dimensional propensity score (HDPS), in
which the estimated hazard ratio became 1.61with a 95%
CI spanning from 0.997 to 2.59. Despite the estimated
61% increase in the hazard rate in the exposed children
2
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and an interval estimate including ratios as large as 2.59
and no lower than 0.997, the authors still declared that
there was no association between in utero serotonergic
antidepressant exposure and ASD because it was not “sta-
tistically significant.” This was amisinterpretation of their
own results because an association was not only present,
but also quite close to the 70% increase they reported
from previous studies [28]. Yet themedia simply repeated
Brown et al.’s misstatement that there was no association
after adjustment [29].
This type of misreporting remains common, despite
the increasing awareness that such dichotomous thinking
is detrimental to sound science and the ongoing efforts to
retire statistical significance [22, 24, 30–34]. To aid these
efforts, wewill explain the importance of showing results
for a range of hypotheses, whichmay help readers seewhy
conclusions such as in Brown et al. [27, 29] represent dra-
matic misinterpretations of statistics – even though the
reported numeric summaries are correct. Wewill explain
why it would be correct to instead have reported that
“After HDPS adjustment for confounding, a 61% hazard
elevation remained; however, under the same model, every
hypothesis from no elevation up to a 160% hazard increase
had p ≥ 0.05; Thus, while quite imprecise, these results are
consistent with previous observations of a positive association
between serotonergic antidepressant prescriptions and subse-
quent ASD. Because the association may be partially or wholly
due to uncontrolled biases, further evidence will be needed for
evaluating what, if any, proportion of it can be attributed to
causal effects of prenatal serotonergic antidepressant use on
ASD incidence."
We believe this type of language is careful and nu-
anced, and that such cautious attention to detail is essen-
tial for accurate scientific reporting.
3 | MAKING SENSE OF TESTS
3.1 | THE P-VALUE AS A
COMPATIBILITY MEASURE
The infamous observed P-value p (originally called the ob-
served or attained “level of significance” or “value of P”
[35–37]) is a measure of compatibility between the ob-
served data and a targeted test hypothesisH, given a set
of background assumptions (the backgroundmodel) which
are used alongwith the hypothesis to compute the P-value
from the data. By far themost common example of a test
hypothesisH is a traditional null hypothesis, such as “there
is no association” or (more ambitiously) “there is no treat-
ment effect.” In some books this null hypothesis is the only
test hypothesis ever mentioned. Nonetheless, the test hy-
pothesis H could just as well be “the treatment doubles
the risk” or “the treatment halves the risk” or any other
hypothesis of practical interest [38]; we will argue such
alternatives to the null should also be testedwhenever the
traditional null hypothesis is tested. Our discussion will
also apply whenH concerns multiple parameters and thus
the test involves multiple degrees of freedom, for example
a general test of linearity of trend (dose-response) when a
treatment has 5 levels (which has 3 degrees of freedom).
With this general background about the test hypothe-
sis, the other key ingredient in traditional statistical test-
ing is a test statistic, such as a Z -score or χ2, which mea-
sures the discrepancy between the observed data and
what would have been expected under the test hypothesis,
given the background assumptions. We can now define
an observed P-value p as the probability of the test statis-
tic being at least as extreme as observed if the hypothe-
sis H targeted for testing and every assumption used to
compute the P-value (the test hypothesisH and the back-
ground statistical model) were correct [38]. Those back-
ground assumptions typically include a host of conditions
such as linearity of responses and additivity of effects on a
given scale; appropriateness of included variables (e.g., no
intermediates for the effect under study); unimportance
of omitted variables (e.g., all important confounding is con-
trolled), random errors in a given family, no selection bias,
and full accounting for measurement error andmodel se-
lection.
This accurate and technical description does not ac-
cord well with human psychology, however: It is often said
by Bayesians that researchers want a probability for the
targeted test hypothesis (posterior probability ofH), not
a probability of observations. This imperative is indicated
by themany “intuitive” – and incorrect – verbal definitions
and descriptions of the P-value that amount to calling it
the probability of the test hypothesis, which is quite mis-
leading [38]. Such errors are often called inversion fallacies
because they invert the role of the observations and the
hypothesis in defining the P-value (which is a probability
3
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for the observed test statistic, not the test hypothesis).
A standard frequentist criterion for judging whether
a P-value is valid for statistical testing is that all possible
values for it from zero to one are equally likely (uniform
in probability) if the test hypothesis and background as-
sumptions are correct. We discuss this criterion in more
detail in the Appendix. With this validity criterionmet, we
can also correctly describe the P-value as the percentile or
proportion at which the observed test statistic falls in the
distribution for the test statistic under the test hypothesis
and the background assumptions [39, 40]. The purpose
of this description is to connect the P-value to a familiar
concept, the percentile at which someone’s score fell on a
standard test (e.g., a college or graduate admissions exami-
nation), as opposed to the abstract (and tooeasily inverted)
probability definition.
3.2 | THE S-VALUE
Even when P-values are correctly defined and valid,
their scaling canbedeceptive due to their compression
into the interval from0 to1,with vastly differentmean-
ings for absolute differences in P-values near 1 and the
same differences for P-values near 0 [25], as we will
describe below. One way to reduce test misinterpre-
tations and provide more intuitive numerical results is
to translate theP-values into probabilities of outcomes
in familiar games of chance. Consider a game in which
one coin will be tossed and we will bet on tails. Be-
fore playing however we want evidence that the toss-
ing is acceptable for our bet, by which we mean not bi-
ased toward heads, because such loading would make
our losing more probable than not. To check accept-
ability, suppose we first do s independent test tosses
and they all come up heads. If the tossing is accept-
able, the chance of this happening is at most 1/2s , the
chance of all heads in s unbiased (fair) tosses. The
smaller this chance, the less we would trust that the
game is acceptable. In fact we could take s as mea-
suring our evidence against acceptability: If we only
did one toss and it came up heads (s = 1) that would
be unsurprising if the tossing were unbiased for then
it would have chance 1/2, and so would provide barely
any evidence against acceptability. But if we did 10
tosses and all came up heads (s = 10) that would be sur-
prising if the tossing were unbiased, for the chance of
that is then 1/210 ≈ 0.001, and so would provide con-
siderably more evidence against acceptability. With
this setting in mind, we can now gauge the evidence
supplied by a P-value p by seeing what number s of
heads in a row would come closest to p, which we can
find by solving the equation p = 1/2s for s. The solu-
tion is the negative base-2 logarithm of the P-value, s
= log2(1/p) = − log2(p), known as the binary Shannon in-
formation, surprisal, logworth, or S-value from the test
[25, 41, 42]. The S-value is designed to reduce incor-
rect probabilistic interpretations of statistics by pro-
viding a nonprobability measure of information sup-
plied by the test statistic against the test hypothesisH
[25]. The S-value provides an absolute scale on which
to view the information provided by a valid P-value,
as measured by calibrating the observed p against a
physical mechanism that produces data with known
probabilities. A single coin toss produces a binary out-
come which can be coded as 1 = heads, 0 = tails, and
thus requires only two symbols or states to record or
store; hence the information in a single toss is called
bit, short for binary digit, or a shannon. The informa-
tion describing a sequence of s tosses requires s bits
to record or store; thus, extending this measurement
to a hypothesis H with P-value p, we say the test sup-
plied s =− log2(p) bits of information againstH.We em-
phasize that, without further restrictions, our calibra-
tion of the P-value against coin-tossing is only measur-
ing information against the test hypothesis, not in sup-
port of it. This limitation is for the purely logical rea-
son that there is no way to distinguish among the in-
finitude of background assumptions that lead to a test
with the same or larger P-value and hence the same
or smaller S-value. There is no way the data can sup-
port a test hypothesis except relative to a fixed set of
background assumptions. Rather than taking the back-
ground assumptions for granted, we prefer instead to
adopt a refutational view, which emphasizes that any
claim of support will be undermined by assumption un-
certainty, and is thus best avoided. This caution applies
regardless of the test statistic used, whether P-value,
S-value, Bayes factor, or posterior probability. As with
the P-value, the S-value refers only to a particular test
with particular background assumptions. A different
4
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test based on different background assumptions will
usually produce adifferentP-value and thus adifferent
S-value; thus it would be a mistake to simply call the S-
value “the information against the hypothesis supplied
by the data”, for it is always a test of the hypothesis con-
joined with (or conditioned on) the assumptions. As
a basic example, we may contrast the P-value for the
strict null hypothesis (of no effect on any experimen-
tal unit) comparing two experimental groups using a
t -test (which, along with randomization, assumes nor-
mally distributed responses under the null hypothesis),
to the P-value from a permutation test (which assumes
only randomization). Finally, as explained in the Ap-
pendix, the S-value can also be expressed using other
logarithmic units such as natural (base-e) logs, − ln(p),
which is mathematically more convenient but not as
easy to represent physically.
3.3 | USING THE S-VALUE
With the S-value in hand, a cognitive difficulty of the
P-value scale for evidence can be seen by first not-
ing that the difference in the evidence provided by P-
values of 0.9999 and 0.90 is trivial: Both represent
almost no information against the test hypothesis, in
that the corresponding S-values are − log2(0.9999) =
0.00014bits and− log2(0.90)=0.15bits. Both are far
less than1bit of informationagainst thehypothesis –
they are just a fraction of a coin toss different. In con-
trast, the information against the test hypothesis in
P-values of 0.10 and 0.0001 is profoundly different,
in that the corresponding S-values are − log2(0.10) =
3.32 and − log2(0.0001) = 13.3 bits; thus p = 0.001
provides 10 bits more information against the test
hypothesis than does p = 0.10, corresponding to the
informationprovidedby10additional heads in a row.
The contrast is illustrated in Figure 1, along with
other examples of the scaling difference between
P and S values. The alpha levels used in genome-
wide association studies and particle physics are ex-
tremely small because in those areas false positives
are considered far more costly than false negatives;
for amore extensive discussion see [43, 44].
As an example of this perspective on reported re-
sults, from the point and interval estimate from the
HDPS analysis reported by Brown et al. [27], we cal-
culated that the P-value for the “null” test hypoth-
esis H that the hazard ratio is 1 (no association) is
0.0505. Using the S-value to measure the informa-
tion supplied by the HDPS analysis against this hy-
pothesis, we get s = − log2(0.0505) = 4.31 bits; this
is hardly more than 4 coin tosses worth of informa-
tion against no association. For comparison, when
setting the test hypothesis H to be that the hazard
ratio is 2 (doubling of the hazard among the treated),
we calculated a P-value of about 0.373. The infor-
mation supplied by the HDPS analysis against this
test hypothesis is then measured by the S-value as s
= − log2(0.373) = 1.42 bits, hardly more than a coin-
toss worth of information against doubling of the
hazard among the treated. In these terms, then, the
HDPS results supply roughly3bitsmore information
against no association than against doubling of the
hazard, so that doubling (HR = 2) is more compatible
with the analysis results than is no association (HR =
1).
S-values help clarify objections to comparing P-
values to sharp dichotomies. Consider that a P-value
of 0.06 yields about 4 bits of information against
the test hypothesis H, while a P-value of 0.03 yields
about 5 bits of information againstH. Thus, p = 0.06
is about as surprising as getting all heads on four
fair coin tosses while p = 0.03 is one toss (one bit)
more surprising. Even if one is committed to making
a decision based on a sharp cutoff, S-values illustrate
what range around that cutoff corresponds to a triv-
ial information difference (e.g., any P-value between
0.025 and 0.10 is less than a coin-toss difference in
evidence from p = 0.05).
5
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        S-values
(bits of information)
p = 0.9999
s = 0.0001
p = 0.90
s = 0.15s = 13.29
More compatible with the test model
More information against the test model
p = 0.0001    P-values
(compatibility)
p = 0.10
s = 3.32
Same absolute differences in P-values (both differences = 0.0999)   
However, vastly different differences in corresponding S-values (9.97 bits vs. < 0.15 bits)
Difference = 0.0999 Difference = 0.0999 
Difference = 9.97 bits Difference < 0.15 bits 
FIGURE 1: Comparison of P-value and S-value scales. Top labels: Data compatibility with test
model as measured by P-values. Bottom labels: Information against test model as measured by
the corresponding S-values.
S-values also help researchers understand more subtle problems with tradi-
tional testing. Consider for example the import of the magical 0.05 threshold
(α-level) that is used to declare associations present or absent. It has often been
claimed that this threshold is too high to be regarded as representing much
evidence againstH [14, 21], but the arguments for that are usually couched in
Bayesian terms of which many remain skeptical. We can however see those
objections to 0.05 straightforwardly by noting that the threshold translates into
requiring an S-value of only − log2(0.05) = 4.32 bits of information against the
null; that means p = 0.05 is barely more surprising than getting all heads on 4 fair
coin tosses.
While 4 heads in a row may seem surprising to some intuitions, it does in
fact correspond to doing only 4 tosses to study the coin; a sample size of N = 4
binary outcomeswould rarely qualify as a basis for (say) recommending a new
treatment even if all 4 patients recovered but the recovery rate without the
treatment was known to be 50%. Thus, like other proposals, the S-value calls
into question the traditional α = 0.05 cut-off, and may help users realize how
little information is contained inmost P-valueswhen compared to the thousands
of bits of information in a typical cell-phone directory.
6
Compatibility and Surprise, Not Confidence and Significance arXiv: 1909.08579 | Version: 18 Jun. 2020
Further crucial informationwill be given by P-values and S-values for
tabulated for several alternative hypotheses, interval estimates over vary-
ing percentiles, and graphs of data and information summaries such as
those illustrated below.
4 | FURTHER ADVANTAGES OF S-VALUES
Unlike probabilities, S-values are unbounded above and are additive over
independent information sources, thus providing a scale for comparing
test results across hypotheses that is aligned with information rather than
probability measurement [25]. Another advantage of S-values is that they
help thwart inversion fallacies, in which a P-value is misinterpreted as a
probability of a hypothesis being correct (or equivalently, as the probability
that a statement about the hypothesis is in error). Hypothesis probabilities
computed using the data are called posterior probabilities (because they
come after the data). It is difficult to confuse an S-value with a posterior
probability because the S-value is unbounded above, and in fact will be
above 1whenever the P-value is below 0.50.
Probabilities of data summaries (test statistics) given hypotheses and
probabilities of hypotheses given data are identically scaled, leading users
to inevitably conflate P-values with posterior probabilities. This confu-
sion dominates observedmisinterpretations [38] and is invited with open
arms by “significance” and “confidence” terminology. Suchmistakes could
potentially be avoided by giving actual posterior probabilities alongwith
P-values. Bayesian methods provide such probabilities but require prior
distributions as input; in turn, those priors require justifications based
on often contentious background information. While the task of creating
such distributions can be instructive, this extra input burden has greatly
deterred adoption of Bayesian methods; in contrast, S-values provide a
direct quantification of information without this input.
7
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TABLE 1: Some P-values and Their Corresponding S-values, Maximum-Likelihood Ratios
(MLR), and Likelihood-Ratio (LR) Statistics 2ln(MLR).*
P-value p
(compatibility)
S-value s = − log2(p)
(bits of information)
Maximum-Likelihood
Ratio
Likelihood-Ratio
Statistic
0.99 0.014 1.00 0.00016
0.90 0.15 1.01 0.016
0.50 1.00 1.26 0.45
0.25 2.00 1.94 1.32
0.10 3.32 3.87 2.71
0.05 4.32 6.83 3.84
0.025 5.32 12.3 5.02
0.01 6.64 27.6 6.63
0.005 7.64 51.4 7.88
0.0001 13.3 1935 15.1
3 in 10million (5 sigma) 21.7 5.2 × 105 26.3
1 in a billion (6 sigma) 29.9 1.3 × 107 37.4
Table 1 provides a translation of the P-value to the binary S-value s = − log2(p).
It also gives the maximum-likelihood ratio (MLR), and the deviance-difference or
likelihood-ratio statistic 2 ln(MLR ), assuming thatH is a simple hypothesis about
one parameter (e.g., that a mean difference or regression coefficient is zero). The
MLR is the value of the likelihood function at its maximum under the set of back-
ground assumptions A, divided by its (reduced) maximum when the test hypoth-
esis H is added to the assumptions [45–48]. The MLR defined this way is always
above 1. The MLR and deviance statistic are themselves often treated as mea-
sures of information against H under the background assumptions (fortuitously,
when rounding to the nearest integer, the binary S-value and deviance statistic co-
incide in the often-contentious P-value range of 0.005 to 0.10).
Further details of the relations among these and other measures are given in
the Appendix. Table 2 presents these measures as computed from the Brown et
al. report [27]; it can again be seen that by anymeasure there is more information
against the null (equal hazards across treatment, S = 4.31) than against doubling
of the hazard (HR=2, S=1.42), so the claim that these results demonstrate or sup-
port no association is simply wrong.
* Further details of the relations among thesemeasures are given in the Appendix.
8
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TABLE 2: P-values, S-values, Maximum-Likelihood Ratios, and Likelihood-Ratio Statistics For Various Test Hypotheses
About the Hazard Ratio (HR) Computed fromBrown et al. [27] HDPS results.†
Test Hypothesis (H)
P-value
(compatibility)
S-value
(bits of information)
Maximum-
Likelihood Ratio
Likelihood-
Ratio Statistic
Halving of hazard (HR = 0.5) 1.6 × 10−6 19.3 1.0 × 105 23.1
No association (null) (HR = 1) 0.05 4.31 6.77 3.82
Point estimate (HR = 1.61) 1 0.00 1.00 0.00
Doubling of hazard (HR = 2) 0.37 1.42 1.49 0.79
Tripling of hazard (HR = 3) 0.01 6.56 26.2 6.53
Quintupling of hazard (HR = 5) 3.3 × 10−6 18.2 5.0 × 104 21.7
In summary, the S-value provides a gauge of the information supplied by a statistical
test in familiar terms of coin tosses. It thus complements the probability interpreta-
tion of a P-value by supplying a mechanism that can be visualized with simple physi-
cal experiments. Given amply documented human tendencies to underestimate the
frequency of seemingly “unusual” events [49], these experiments can guide intuitions
about what evidence strength a given P-value actually represents.
5 | REPLACE UNREALISTIC CONFIDENCE CLAIMS WITH
COMPATIBILITY MEASURES
Confidence intervals (commonly abbreviated as CI) have been widely promoted as a
solution to the problems of statistical misinterpretation [18, 20]. While we support
their presentation, such intervals have difficulties of their own. The major problem
with “confidence” is that it encourages the common confusion of theCI percentile level
(typically 95%) with the probability that the true value of the parameter is in the inter-
val (mistaking the CI for a Bayesian posterior interval) [38], as in statements such as
“we are 95% confident that the true value is within the interval.”
The fact that “confidence” refers to the procedure behavior, not the reported in-
terval, seems to be lost on most researchers. Remarking on this subtlety, when Jerzy
Neyman discussed his confidence concept in 1934 at ameeting of the Royal Statistical
Society, Arthur Bowley replied, “I am not at all sure that the ’confidence’ is not a confi-
dence trick.” [50].
† Computed from the normal approximations given in the Appendix.
9
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And indeed, forty years later, Cox and Hinkley warned, “interval estimates cannot
be taken as probability statements about parameters, and foremost is the interpreta-
tion ‘such and such parameter values are consistent with the data.’ ” [51]. Unfortu-
nately, the word “consistency” is used for several other concepts in statistics, while in
logic it refers to an absolute condition (of noncontradiction); thus, its use in place of
“confidence” would risk further confusion.
To address the problems above, we exploit the fact that a 95% CI summarizes the
results of varying the test hypothesis H over a range of parameter values, displaying
all values for which p > 0.05 [52] and hence s < 4.32 bits [25, 53]. Thus the CI contains
a range of parameter values that are more compatible with the data than are values
outside the interval, under the background assumptions [25, 38]. Unconditionally (and
thus even if the background assumptions are uncertain), the interval shows the values
of the parameter which, when combined with the background assumptions, produce
a test model that is “highly compatible” with the data in the sense of having less than
4.32 bits of information against it. We thus refer to CI as compatibility intervals rather
than confidence intervals [25, 26, 53]; their abbreviation remains “CI.”Wereject calling
these intervals “uncertainty intervals,” because they do not capture uncertainty about
background assumptions [26].
Another problem is that a frequentist CI is often used as nothing more than a
null-hypothesis significance test (NHST), by declaring that the null parameter value
(e.g., HR = 1) is supported if it is inside the interval, or refuted if it is outside the inter-
val. These declarations defeat the use of interval estimates to summarize information
about the parameter, and perpetuate the fallacy that information changes abruptly
across decision boundaries [32, 38, 53, 54]. In particular, the usual 95% default forces
the user’s focus onto parameter values that yield p > 0.05, without regard to the trivial
difference between (say) p = 0.06 and p = 0.04 (an information difference far smaller
than a coin toss). Even differences conventionally seen as “large” are often minor in
information terms, e.g., p = 0.02 and p = 0.16 represent a difference of only log2( 0.160.02 ) =
3 coin tosses, underscoring the caution that the difference between “significance” and
“nonsignificance” is not significant[55].
To address this problem, we first note that a 95% interval estimate is only one of a
numberof arbitrarydichotomizationof possibilities of parameter values (into either in-
side or outside of an interval). Amore accurate picture of information is then obtained
by examining intervals using other percentiles, e.g., proportionally-spaced compatibil-
ity levels such as p > 0.25, 0.05, 0.01, which correspond to 75%, 95%, 99% CIs and
equally-spaced S-values of s < 2, 4.32, 6.64 bits. When a detailed picture is desired, a
tableor graphofP-values and S-values across abroad rangeofparameter values seems
the clearest way to see how compatibility varies smoothly across the values.
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FIGURE 2: P-values for a range of hazard ratios (HR). A compatibility graph in which P-values are plotted across
alternative hazard ratios. Computed from results in Brown et al. [27]. Compatibility intervals (CI) in percents can be
readmoving from the right-hand axis to the bottom (HR) axis. HR = 1 represents no association.
6 | GRADATIONS, NOT DICHOTOMIES
Graphs of P-values or their equivalent have been promoted for decades [54,
56–58], yet their adoption has been slight. Nonetheless, P-value and S-value
graphing software is now available freely through several statistical packages
[59–62]. A graph of the P-values p against possible parameter values allows
one to see at a glance which parameter values are most compatible with the
data under the background assumptions. This graph is known as the P-value
function, or compatibility, consonance, or confidence curve [54, 56–58, 63–
67]; the “severity curve” ([17], fig. 5.5) is a special case (see Appendix). Trans-
forming the corresponding P-values in the graph to S-values produces an S-
value (surprisal) function.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 give the P-value and S-value graphs produced from
the Brown et al. [27] data, displaying an estimated hazard ratio of 1.61 and
95% limits of 0.997, 2.59 (see Appendix for computational details). Following
the common (and important) warning that P-values are not hypothesis proba-
bilities, we caution that the P-value graph is not a probability distribution: It
shows compatibility of parameter valueswith the data, rather than plausibility
or probability of those values given the data. This is not a subtle difference:
compatibility is a much weaker condition than plausibility. Consider for exam-
ple that complete fabrication of the data is always an explanation compatible
with the data (and indeed has happened in some influential medical studies
[68]), but in studies with many participants and authors involved in all aspects
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sents no association.
of data collection it becomes so implausible as to not even merit mention. We
emphasize then that all the P-value ever addresses in a direct logical sense is
compatibility; for hypothesis probabilities onemust turn to Bayesianmethods
[25].
The P-value graph rises past HR = 1 (no association) until it peaks at the
point estimate of 1.61, which coincides with the smallest S-value. The graphs
showhow rapidly the P-values fall and the S-values rise aswemove away from
the point estimate. CIs at the 75, 95, and 99 percent levels can be read off the
graphas the rangebetween theparameter valueswhere thegraph is above the
P = 0.25, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Both Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate how mis-
leading it is to framediscussion in termsofwhetherP is aboveorbelow0.05, or
whether the null value is included in the 95% CI: Every hazard ratio from 1 to
2.58 ismore compatiblewith the Brown et al. [27] data according to theHDPS
analysis, and has less information against it than does the null value of 1. Thus,
as the graphsmake clear, the analysis provides absolutely no basis for claiming
the study found “no association.” Instead, the analysis exhibits an association
similar to that seen in earlier studies and should have been reported as such,
even though it leaves open the question of what caused the association (e.g., a
drug effect, a bias, a positive random error, or some combination).
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7 | MOVING FORWARD
Most efforts to reform statistical reporting have promoted
interval estimates [18, 20] or Bayesianmethods [21] over
P-values. There is nonetheless scant empirical evidence
that these or any proposals (including ours) have improved
or will improve reporting without accompanying editorial
and reviewer efforts to enforce proper interpretations.
Instead, the above example andmany others [25, 69, 70]
illustrate how, without proper editorial monitoring, inter-
val estimates are often of no help and can even be harmful
when journals require dichotomous interpretation of re-
sults, for example as does JAMA [71].
Cognitive psychology and its offshoot of behavioral
economics (the “heuristics and biases” literature) have
been studying misperceptions of probability for at least
a half-century (e.g., see the anthologies of [72, 73]), with
increasing attention to the harms of null-hypothesis sig-
nificance testing (e.g., [2, 74]). Informal classroom obser-
vations on the devices we discuss have been encouraging
(both our own and those reported to us anecdotally by
colleagues), leading to the present exposition.
We would thus encourage formal experiments to
study cognitive devices like those we discuss. To justify
such effort, the devices must be well-grounded in sta-
tistical theory (as reviewed in the prequel to this article
[25]), and should be clearly operationalized, as the cur-
rent article attempts to do. These preliminaries are espe-
cially important because prevailing practice is cemented
into nearly a century of routine teaching and journal de-
mands; thus, any comparison today will be dramatically
confounded by tradition and exposure. Addressing this
imbalance will require detailed instruction in the graphical
information perspective, as illustrated here.
7.1 | TESTS OF MODEL FIT
For simplicitywe have focused on tests of specific hypothe-
ses given a set of assumptions (the background model).
The S-value can also be used to measure information
against a datamodel, as supplied by the P-value from gen-
eral tests of fit of a model to the data (such as the Pearson
[36] chi-squared test of fit). In those tests, all deviations of
the data from themodel predictions contribute to lack of
fit and are cumulated as evidence against themodel. In yet
another unfortunate misnaming, these tests have come
to be called “goodness of fit” tests, when in fact the test
statistics aremeasuringmisfit (in Pearson’s case, squared
distances between the predictions and observations). The
P-value accounts for the residual degrees of freedom for
themisfit, but as discussed before, is scaled in a nonintu-
itive way: It shrinks to zero as misfit increases, even when
misfit can increase indefinitely. The S-value restores the
proper relation to the fit as seen in the original test statis-
tic, where the cumulative information against themodel
growing larger without bound asmisfit increases without
bound.
7.2 | CONNECTIONS TO BAYESIAN AND
INFORMATION STATISTICS
Our development has been based on conventional fre-
quentist statistics, which focus on probabilities of vari-
ous statistical observations (data features). There are sev-
eral connections of P-values and compatibility intervals
to Bayesian statistics, which are expressed in terms of hy-
pothesis probabilities; for a basic review see [75]. These in
turn lead to connections to S-values. Consider for example
a one-sided P-value p for a directional hypothesis; under
certain assumptions p is a lower bound on the posterior
probability that the hypothesis is false, and the S-value s
= − log2(p) can be interpreted as the maximum surprisal
in finding the hypothesis is false, given the data and as-
sumptions. The Appendix describes a connection to Bayes
factors.
If we redefine the S-value in terms of natural logs
− ln(p) = − ln(2) log2(p), the resulting “natural” surprisal
measure is an example of a general statistical testing con-
cept labeled “S-value” by Grünwald et al. [76], and is also
an example of a parallel concept labeled “betting score”
[77]. These concepts require moremathematical detail to
define than we use here; hence we defer discussion to the
Appendix.
7.3 | SOME CAUTIONS
Demands for more statistical evidence against test hy-
potheses increase the need for numerical accuracy, espe-
cially because traditional normal Z-score (Wald) approx-
imations (used by most software to derive P-values and
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compatibility intervals under nonlinear models) deterio-
rate as the P-value or α-level becomes smaller [47]. Adding
that approximation error to the usual study uncertainties,
we do not expect P-values below 0.001 from Z-scores to
havemore than 2-digit accuracy, and thus advise rounding
S-values above − log(0.001) ≈ 10 to the nearest integer.
The S-values for testing the same hypothesis from
(say) K independent studies can be summed to provide a
measure of the total information against the hypothesis. A
caution is needed in that the resulting sumwill have an ex-
pectation equal toK under the hypothesis and background
assumptions. Thus its size must be evaluated against a dis-
tribution that increases with K (specifically, by doubling
the sum and comparing it to a chi-squared distribution
with 2K degrees of freedom) [25, 78].
In Bayesian settings, one may see certain P-values
that are not valid frequentist P-values (see Appendix), the
primary example being the posterior predictive P-value
[79, 80]. As explained in the Appendix, the negative logs
of such invalid P-values do not measure surprisal at the
statistic given themodel, and so are not a valid S-values in
our terms.
As mentioned earlier, one purpose of converting P-
values to S-values is to thwart the fallacy of mistaking data
probabilities like a P-value for hypotheses probabilities.
It is often said that this fallacy is addressed by Bayesian
methods because they give the reader hypothesis proba-
bilities. A problemwith such probabilities is that deriving
them requires the analyst to supply a prior distribution
(“prior”) that supplies initial probabilities for competing
hypotheses. In many serious applications, there is no sim-
ple, universal, and reliable guide to choosing a prior (other
than as a shrinkage/penalization/regularization device to
improve certain frequency properties), and thus posterior
probability statements can vary considerably across ana-
lysts evenwhen there is no disagreement about frequen-
tist results [81]). That problem is precisely why frequen-
tists reject Bayesianmethods as a general foundation for
data analysis.
In sharp contrast, frequencymodels for the data can
be enforced by experimental devices, producing informa-
tion that can be quantified evenwithout agreement about
a prior distribution for targeted quantities. This quantifica-
tion does not preclude a further analysis which combines
the experimental information with external information
encoded in a penalty function or prior distribution (which
may be partial [82]). Nor does it free data analysts from
responsibility to weaken their interpretations when using
methods derived from devices or assumptions that are not
known to be operative [83]. For example, explanations
for results from randomization tests in nonrandomized
studies must include not only treatment effects and ran-
dom error among possible explanations, but also effects of
randomization failure [84, 85].
Finally, we caution that Gelman and Carlin [86] refer
to erroneously inferring thewrong sign of a parameter as
“type-S error”, an entirely different usage of “S”.
7.4 | TESTS OF DIFFERENT VALUES FOR
A PARAMETER VS. TESTS OF DIFFER-
ENT PARAMETERS
Even if all background assumptions hold, no single number
(whether a P-value, S-value, or point estimate) can by it-
self provide an adequatemeasure of sample information
about a targeted parameter, such as a mean difference,
a hazard ratio (HR), or some other contrast across treat-
ment groups. We have thus formulated our description
to allow the test hypothesisH to refer to different values
for the same parameter. For example,H could be “HR = 1”,
the traditional null hypothesis of no change in hazard rate
across compared groups; butH could just as well be “HR
= 2”, or “HR ≤ 2”, or even “1/2 ≤ HR ≤ 2” [25]. In all these
variations, the set of auxiliary assumptions (background
model) used to compute the statistics stays unchanged;
onlyH is changing. Unconditionally, the S-values for the
different H are measuring information against different
restrictions on HR beyond the background assumptions,
which stay the same.
A similar comment applies when, in amodel, we test
different coefficients: The background assumptions are
unchanged, only the targeted test hypothesisH is chang-
ing, although now the change is to another parameter
(rather than another value for the same parameter). For
example, in a model for effects of cancer treatments we
might compute the P-value and S-value from a test of H
= “the coefficient of radiotherapy is zero” and another P-
value and S-value from a test of H = “the coefficient of
chemotherapy is zero.” Conditionally, these two S-values
are giving information against different target hypotheses
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H; for example, using a proportional-hazardsmodel, that
background includes the assumption that the effects of
different treatments on the hazard multiply together to
produce the total effect of all treatments combined. Un-
conditionally, these S-values are measuring information
against different test models: a model with no effect of
radiotherapy but allowing an effect of chemotherapy, and
a model allowing an effect of radiotherapy but no effect
of chemotherapy; all other assumptions are the same in
bothmodels (including possibly unseen and inappropriate
assumptions about causal ordering [87]).
Testingdifferent parameterswith the samedata raises
issues of multiple comparisons (also known as simultane-
ous inference). These issues are very complex and contro-
versial, with opinions about multiple-comparison adjust-
ment ranging from complete dismissal of adjustments to
demands for mindless, routine use, and extend far beyond
the present scope; see [88, 89] for a recent commentary
and a review. We can only note here that the devices we
recommend can also be applied to adjusted comparisons;
for example, the S-value computed from an adjusted P-
value becomes the information against a hypothesis penal-
ized (reduced) to account for multiplicity.
We caution however against confusing the problem
of testing multiple parameters with the testing of multi-
ple values of the same parameter, as we recommend here:
Tests of the same parameter are logically dependent in a
manner eliminating the need for adjustment. This depen-
dency can be seen in how a P-value for HR ≤ 1 must be
less than the P-value for the less restrictive HR ≤ 2 (using
a test derived from the same method and assumptions).
Note also that a compatibility interval requires selection
of values based onmultiple tests of the parameter, namely
the values for which p = α; this selection does not harm
any frequency property of the interval (e.g., coverage of
the true parameter value at a rate 1 - α if all background
assumptions are correct).
8 | CONCLUSION
Ongoingmisinterpretations of importantmedical research
demonstrate the need for simple reforms to traditional
terms and interpretations. As lamented elsewhere, [24, 31,
53, 90], those traditions have led to overinterpretations
andmisinterpretations becoming standards of reporting
in leading medical journals, with ardent defense of such
malpractice by those invested in the traditions. Especially
when there is doubt about conventional assumptions, over-
confident terms like “significance,” “confidence,” and “sever-
ity” and decisive interpretations should be replacedwith
more cautiously graded unconditional descriptions such
as “compatibility”; narrowly compressed probabilities like
P-values can be supplementedwith additive-information
concepts like S-values; and requests can bemade for tables
or graphs of P-values and S-values for multiple alternative
hypotheses, rather than forcing focus onto null hypotheses
[25, 54, 58, 91]. These reforms need to be given a serious
chance via editorial encouragement in both review and
instructions to authors.
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9 | APPENDIX
An extended technical discussion of S-values and unconditional information can be
found in Greenland [25]. Here we briefly cover issues raised in themain test of our
current paper.
9.1 | UNITS FOR THE S-VALUE
Other units for measuring information other than bits arise from different choices
for the base of the logarithms. For example, using natural (base-e) logs, the S-value
becomes se = − ln(p)whose units are called “nats,” while using common (base-10)
logs, the units are called hartleys, bans, or “dits” (decimal digits). The ratio of one
dit of information to one bit of information is 3.22 which is similar to the ratio of
meters to feet, 3.28. Just as the choice ofmeters vs. feet does not affect the concepts
andmethods surrounding length measurement, so choice of dits vs. bits does not
affect any of the concepts or methods of informationmeasurement. Bits aremost
commonly used in engineering because the fundamental physical components in
electronic information storage are binary and thus their information capacity is
one bit. Natural logs are howevermoremathematically convenient and thusmore
common in statistical theory (see below).
9.2 | UNIFORMITY OF THE P-VALUE
AND THE INFORMATION IN THE S-VALUE
The decision rule “reject H if p ≤ α” will reject H 100α% of the time under sam-
pling from a model M obeying H (i.e., the Type-1 error rate of the test will be α)
provided the random variable P corresponding to p is valid (uniform under themodel
M used to compute it), but not necessarily otherwise [92]. This is one reason why
frequentist writers reject invalid P-values (such as posterior predictive P-values,
which highly concentrate around 0.50) and devote considerable technical coverage
to uniform P-values [79, 80, 92]. Valid P-values (“U-values”) translate into exponen-
tially distributed S-values withmean log2(e)where e is the base of the natural logs.
Uniformity is also central to the “refutational information” interpretation of the
S-value used here, for it is necessary to ensure that the P-value p from which s is
derived is in fact the percentile of the observed value of the test statistic in the distri-
bution of the statistic underM, thus making small p surprising underM andmaking s
the corresponding degree of surprise. Because posterior predictive P-values do not
translate into sampling percentiles of the statistic under the hypothesis (in fact, they
are pulled toward 0.5 from the correct percentiles) [79, 80], the resulting negative
log does notmeasure surprisal at the statistic givenM, and so is not a valid S-value in
our terms.
21
Compatibility and Surprise, Not Confidence and Significance arXiv: 1909.08579 | Version: 18 Jun. 2020
The coin-toss interpretation we have used to physically illustrate this surprise
assumes that the only alternative to fairness is in the direction of loading for heads.
The S-value it produces thus corresponds to a P-value for the 1-sided hypothesis
Pr(heads)≤ 1/2; nonetheless, this interpretation applies even if the original observed
P-value pwas 2-sided. This translation from a 2-sided P-value to a 1-sided S-value
parallels the transformation of P-values into 1-sided sigmas (Z-scores) in physics, in
which for example a P-value of 0.05 from a two-sided test would become a sigma of
1.645, the upper one-sided 5% cutoff for a standard-normal deviate [43].
9.3 | OTHER MEASURES OF STATISTICAL
INFORMATION ABOUT A TEST HYPOTHESIS OR MODEL
A commonmeasure for evaluating a hypothesis or model restrictionH under back-
ground assumptions or unrestrictedmodelA is themaximum-likelihood ratio (MLR),
which is the value of the likelihood function at itsmaximumunderA alone, divided by
its (restricted) maximumwhen the test hypothesisH is additionally imposed [46, 48].
TheMLR defined this way is always above 1; it is however sometimes confused with
the posterior odds against the tested valueH given A, which it equals only under
very special (and usually unrealistic) conditions. TheMLR does however show the
most extreme increase in posterior odds againstH that the data could produce given
A. The corresponding informationmeasure paralleling the S-value is the deviance
difference or likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic forH givenA, 2 ln(MLR ), which is itself a
test statistic forH givenA. The change in the Akaike Information Criterion (without
small-sample adjustment) from addingH to the backgroundmodel is 2 ln(MLR ) − 2d
where d is the dimension (degrees of freedom) ofH [46, 93].
Now consider a sharp constraint hypothesis H with a P-value less than 1/e =
0.368. Bayarri & Berger [94] and Sellke et al. [21] show that b = −e · p · ln(p) =
e · p · se is a sharp lower bound on the Bayes factor for H under A, where A now
includes strong restrictions on the alternatives toH. (A Bayes factor is the ratio of
posterior data probabilities underH and an alternative, givenA.) Thus, givenA and
the data, b is a lower bound on the reduction in odds forH givenA in moving from
a prior to a posterior, and 1/b is an upper bound on the increase in odds againstH
givenA. Simple numeric examples show that the latter bound is much lower than the
MLR. The strength of the restrictions added toA is indicated for example by the fact
that for p = 0.05 theMLR in Table 1 is 6.83, while 1/b is only 2.46. Sellke at al. [21]
also discuss how 1( 1+1b ) is the Type-1 error rate for a particular type of conditionaldecision rule.
Grünwald et al. [76] introduce a general concept they call an S-test statistic
(where “S” stands for “safe”) forH givenA, defined as any random variable S satisfy-
ing EM (S ) ≤ 1 under anymodelM obeyingH andA. They also call this S an “S-value”.
As noted above, our binary S-value S2 = − log2(P ) can be redefined using natural
logs and thus rescaled to units of nats instead of units of bits, via Se = − ln(P ) =
− log2(P ) ln(2). Se is then an example of their S-value, since EM (Se ) ≤ 1 when the
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random P-value P is valid or conservatively valid (uniform or dominated by a uniform
random variable underM); it is also an example of a betting score [77] (hence “S” can
also be taken as “information score”). Grünwald et al. [76] discuss other S-values,
including those based on Bayes factors.
Finally, consider a 1-dimensional continuous parameter µ with test hypotheses
H of the form µ ≤ µ0 and a specified alternative µ ≥ µ1 (or µ = µ0 with alternative
µ = µ1) where µ0 < µ1. In this context, yet another S-word, “severity”, has been used
to refer to the P-value p(µ ≥ µ1) for µ ≥ µ1 (the lower tail of the test statisticm - µ1
for a 1-sided test of µ = µ1 when using the estimatem of µ), which decreases as µ1
increases; see p. 345 and Fig, 5.5 ofMayo [17]. Since the complement p(µ ≤ µ1) =
1 - p(µ ≥ µ0) is the P-value for µ ≤ µ1, we find that (whatever the base) the corre-
sponding S-value function s(µ ≤ µ1) = − log(p(µ ≤ µ1))measuring the information
against µ ≤ µ1 increases as p(µ ≥ µ1) increases; thus p(µ ≥ µ1) varies directly with
the information s(µ ≤ µ1) against µ ≤ µ1 (the casewith alternative µ1 < µ0 is handled
symmetrically). This so-called “severity” of the test of the originalH (µ ≤ µ0) is not
in fact a function of µ0 and so is identical for all µ0. Furthermore, it incorporates no
information about background assumptions (e.g., whether treatment assignment
was blinded) which bear heavily on practical notions of severity. We thus conclude
that it is misleading to label p(µ ≥ µ1) as a severity measure, and it instead should be
recognized and treated as the P-value function it is.
9.4 | TECHNICAL DETAILS OF COMPUTATIONS
FOR THE TABLES
Table 1 shows relations under the standard 1 degree-of-freedom (df) χ2 approxima-
tion for the LR statistic whenH is a hypothesis that a parameter equals a specific
value, e.g., for the hypothesis that a hazard ratio HR equals the number r,H: HR =
r. For normal (Gaussian) data these relations are exact and the LR statistic reduces
to squared Z -score for the hypothesis [46]. The S-value and LR statistic track each
other rather closely although the latter increases more rapidly. Their relation re-
flects that, under the test model and the standard approximations, the P-value is
uniform and hence the S-value is unit-exponential, which is half a 2 df χ2 [35] and
hence has a heavier right tail than the 1 df LR statistic; specifically, with x = ln(r ),
the ratio of densities for the 2 df and 1 df χ2 is proportional to x 1/2.
For Table 2 and the figures, statistics were computed from the approximate
normal distribution used for theCIs in Brown et al. [27], inwhich the log-hazard ratio
ln(HR ) is estimated to havemeanm = ln(1.61) and standard deviation d = ln( 2.59.997 )2(1.96) .
The P-value forH: HR = r is then derived from the normal score Z = ln( 1.61r )d , and the
LR statistic and MLR are approximated by Z 2 and exp( Z 22 ). For contrast to the P-
graph in Figure 2, Figure S1 shows the relative likelihood function, 1/MLR , produced
from the Brown et al. HDPS results, taking the maximum as the reference point
so that the graph extends from 0 to 1. It may be noticed that this function appears
proportional a posterior probability density for ln(HR ), but this proportionality holds
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only under very special conditions. For contrast to the S-graph in Figure 3, Figure S2
shows the corresponding deviance function 2 ln(MLR ).
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